“The Battle of Salamis: The Naval Encounter That Saved Greece – and Western Civilization”, by Barry S. Strauss

294 pages, Simon & Schuster, ISBN-13: 978-0743244510

 

Professor Strauss has, with The Battle of Salamis: The Naval Encounter That Saved Greece – and Western Civilization, written one of the best books on the Greek-Persian wars – no small feat considering the fact that the writer is dealing with almost no primary sources and secondary sources that are 80 years on average removed from the event. He begins by placing the battle in its wider context to the Persian War, which lasted from 499-479 B.C. He briefly takes us through earlier battles of 480 B.C. which lead up to Salamis, including the Naval Battle at Artemisium and the famous land battle at Thermopylae, where Leonidis and his 300 Spartans gained everlasting fame. Finally, he leads up to the battle as the Persians sack Athens, and most of the residents take refuge on the horseshoe shaped island of Salamis, which is viewable from the Acropolis (he also mentions how Salamis is the home to the legendary King Ajax, who was famed in Homer’s Iliad; it is little side-notes like these that make Professor Strauss’ book so enjoyable to read). Strauss likewise gives us character portraits of the main participants in the battle, most importantly Themistocles, the wily Athenian Commander and mastermind behind the battle; Xerxes, the Persian King; and Artemisia, the Queen of Halicarnassus in Anatolia.

The true power of the narrative is in the description of the battle itself, as the outnumbered Greek fleet took on the faster, more experienced Persians, who had the knowledgeable, seafaring Phoenicians on their side. It took place under the gaze of Xerxes, as well as the enraged, displaced Athenians on Salamis, who took every opportunity to vent their hatred at the unlucky Persian sailors who swam to their shores. His descriptions of how in a moment of panic, Artemisia, allied with the Persian fleet, rammed one of the Persians ships to avoid certain destruction herself, and then turned it to her advantage, as Xerxes believed it was an enemy ship, and heaped praise on her afterwards as a hero of the battle.

All told Professors Strauss says 200,000 men took part in the battle and one lone woman, Artemisia, an astronomical figure that he converts to modern statistics as being the equivalent of around 20 million people. Among them was Aeschylus the great Athenian tragedian, who took part and wrote a famous play “The Persians” based partly on his personal experiences. He is one of the ancient sources Strauss relies on, along with the “father of history” himself Herodotus, who is quoted frequently and personally interviewed many of the participants. Another important historian drawn upon is the Roman Plutarch, as well as other less known ancients to leave accounts of the battle. He also briefly notes that a young Pericles was one of the displaced Athenian refugees, and notes that the Macedonians allied with the Persians on their march across the Hellespont through Macedonia, led by an ancestor of Alexander the Great, who would later wage a war of retribution for the Persian invasion. He is quite effective at explaining the importance of the Greek trireme, a slower heavier ship compared with the faster Persian triremes, and how it was possible that the Greeks were able to succeed by using the narrow Salamis straits and deception tactics to their advantage. He then goes on to conclude his story, summarizing the Persian War, which would end a short year later, after the Persians were again routed at Plataea. He also discusses the fate of Themistocles who was eventually banished from Athens and lived the remainder of his days at the Persian court of all places. A rather sad end, he says, for such a great naval commander. 

Professor Strauss has written an indispensable, effectively argued chronicle that is a darn good read. He argues that it was a turning point for western civilization, though he does state that he believes the Greeks would have prevailed eventually. I look forward to reading his future works on the period, and applaud him for bringing such an ancient naval encounter to life so readable.

“Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution”, by Woody Holton

384 pages, Hill and Wang, ISBN-13: 978-0809080618

A lot of myths surround the American founding, and it is not uncommon for many to see a continuum from the Declaration to the Constitution with liberty, freedom, and democracy being solidified along the way. But the exhilaration and potential for empowerment felt in 1776 had largely dissipated by the middle 1780s, as well as the commonality of purpose between elites and the (largely) unwashed masses. The defeat of Britain brought with it economic and political discord. Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution discusses at length the economic hard times that were pervasive in the 13 States dating at least from the last battle of the Revolutionary War in 1781, the attempts to deal with those problems ranging from self-help to legislation, and the impact of those developments on calling for a constitutional convention and the subsequent provisions of the US Constitution.

The states under the Articles of Confederation were not on a sound financial footing when the War broke out. The currency, certificates, bonds, etc., that were issued to pay soldiers and buy supplies greatly depreciated over the next several years; in addition, the hard money supply dried up. Upon discharge, soldiers were forced to sell their certificates at steep discounts to speculators. Both creditors and bondholders insisted on payment of debts and interest on bonds. State governments raised taxes primarily to pay that interest. Farmers and artisans (especially in light of a lack of circulating currency) were faced with both debts and taxes that they could not pay. Widespread foreclosures and confiscation of property administered by local sheriffs were the result. But those middling folks felt more victimized than deficient in compliance. The huge rate of return that speculators got on discounted bonds was especially irksome. The people living mostly in the western part of the states forcibly obstructed courts, sheriffs, and auctions and demanded that legislatures give some measure of debt and tax relief, as well as reintroduce paper money. Shays’ Rebellion in Massachusetts in 1786-87 is the foremost example of citizen self-help.

The ineffectualness of the Articles of Confederation, coupled with what elites saw as irresponsibility and too much democracy on the part of average people and state assemblies, precipitated a constitutional convention in May, 1787. The author discusses the balancing act of the elites of the Convention (virtually all lawyers, merchants and large landowners) in curtailing democracy while appearing to secure it. For example, the provision for people electing members of the lower house of Congress was offset by large electoral districts, which diminishes the potential impact of interest groups (like debt-ridden farmers). Although states could no longer issue currency or give relief to debtors, the newly established right of the federal government to collect import taxes greatly reduced onerous individual tax burdens. Most of the Convention delegates were more concerned with what provisions could get through the state ratifying conventions, than any particular concern for democracy.

The book is a corrective to the usual discussions on the Constitution making process. The author is not concerned with day-to-day Convention affairs, but rather with the underlying economic and political situation leading to the Convention and the general thinking of the delegates. The detailing of the financial hard times consumes much of the book but is a bit muddled, scattered, and repetitious, but nonetheless is informative. Also, it seems that the author overstates the impact that the people had on the final version of the Constitution, despite any unruliness. The founders actually made few concessions to democracy. The anti-Federalists hardly took up the cause of democracy; they were from the same class as the Federalists, but preferred to exercise their power on a state level.

“Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Assassination of JFK”, by Gerald Posner

607 pages, Random House, ISBN-13: 978-0679418252

A few years ago, I saw a copy of Gerald Posner’s book on the JFK assassination, Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Assassination of JFK, in the publisher overstock section of Barnes & Noble and decided, out of simple curiosity, to pick up a copy. I found it entertaining and informative and uplifting, as Posner makes a good case that there was no conspiracy in the killing of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas on November 22^nd 1963, and casts doubts on the contrived attempts to show that there was. The book is not overlong and is, generally, a good read. While not nearly as exhaustive as Reclaiming History: The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy by Vincent Bugliosi (and my first-ever review on An Evergreen Tree of Diabolical Knowledge from way back on January 20, 2012), Case Closed is still, nevertheless, an invaluable weapon in the arsenal of common sense in the JFK assassination wars.

Reflecting in the present on the book from a level of much greater knowledge of the JFK assassination, Case Closed leaves something to be desired, as it is not as robust in its arguments as it really needs to be, and rather too glib in places. However, it is silly to make much of the deficiencies of Case Closed, in the same way it is hard to pick on the Warren Report on the JFK assassination: the only problem with both documents is that they didn't make as good a case for themselves as they could have. For example, Posner gave aid and comfort to conspiracy theories by claiming the FBI obstructed the work of the Warren Commission, even though by all evidence the FBI was up to their normal level of professionalism in carrying out tasks assigned to the bureau by the commission (notice who was giving the orders and who was obeying them).

On the plus side, Case Closed is far more sensible than any conspiracy book, and it did a fair job of discussing New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison’s lunatic crusade to find somebody, anybody, to finger for the assassination, while giving a nice graphical description of the ballistics of the “magic bullet” that hit JFK and Texas Governor John Connally. Posner likewise did a particularly thorough job of dismantling the completely cooked “mysterious deaths” lists that conspiracy geeks like so much, it seems because they can't find any better evidence.

Very notably, Case Closed was one of the first books to debunk the JFK assassination hysteria to make the best-seller lists; had a book like this been a best-seller in the 1960s, it might have helped prevent the JFK conspiracy flying circus from taking off; or example, I believe that one of the big reasons that the 9/11 conspiracy movement faded so much faster was because of the best-selling book that Popular Mechanics published to debunk said 9/11 conspiracy claims. Unfortunately, nobody really put out anything with the same impact to support the Warren Report before Gerald Posner came along.

Not that it matters much now: there was never any convincing reason to think there was a conspiracy in the assassination; clues that suggested a conspiracy were investigated and all went nowhere. After 50+ years, the JFK conspiracy circus has nothing of substance to show for itself; the noise continues, but anyone who simply tunes it out will be given no cause to give the matter further thought. Yes, many Americans say they think there was a conspiracy, but most of them who do only think about the matter when somebody asks them about it; they say whatever pops into their head, and then forget about it again. In another 50+ years, after everyone who remembers November 22^nd 1963 is gone, the question will likely produce nothing more than a blank stare.