416
pages, Alfred A. Knopf, ISBN-13, 978-0307263438
The American Civil
War: A Military History
is typical of many of John Keegan’s books: disorganized and repetitive, with a narrative that is confusing and not even very chronological. A person with no
previous knowledge of the Civil War would easily get lost in this book as it
appears to be no more than a compilation of articles lacking a unified theme.
He makes several factual bloopers (as when he states that Eisenhower ended
segregation in the US military, when every American knows that it was Harry
Truman who did so); he thinks that Tennessee is much closer to Indiana and Ohio than
it actually is; the Great Kanawha River, with all due respect, is NOT a “major
waterway”; and he has a lapse in his usually impeccable language usage when on
page 361 he uses “nauseous” when he means “nauseating”. All of this is not
because Sir John was a poor historian, but rather that he was a chatty one: while
he intends, certainly, to educate his audience, he does so in a casual,
laid-back fashion; as if he and his students were gathered ‘round a warm fire
to talk of many things, rather than as a professor standing at a podium and
holding forth to a throng of know-nothings.
Thus,
for all its flaws, I still found this book worth reading by any serious student of the Civil War, mostly
because anything Keegan wrote is worth reading, but also because he spent many
years studying American wars and the American military and its methods and personally
visited numerous American battlefields. He was well-versed in the history of
European warfare and, therefore, was in an excellent position to make
illuminating comparisons between the American and European experience of war.
Although this is a “military” history, he defined this term broadly and had
much to say about the political and social background of the war, as when he
illustrated the bitterness with which the war was fought by noting the lack of
respect given to Confederate war dead on Northern battlefields. His chapters on
Walt Whitman, the place of African-American soldiers, the role of women and the importance of religion are quite interesting and to the point.
His
military analysis is, of course, the heart of the book, with his first and most
important point bdeing the role geography played in the course and outcome of the
war. The great problem of the Union forces was how to get at the heartland of
the South, and here geography was as great an obstacle as the Confederate Army.
The rivers of the Piedmont Plateau were severe obstacles to any 19th
Century army, as were the rivers, mountains, and forests of Tennessee. The
general question was how to subdue an enemy whose country has no concentrated
economic targets and few concentrations of population? In essence, there were
only two useful military targets for the Northern forces to attack: the
Southern mind and the Southern fighting man. This is what Grant and Sherman
realized, accepted and put into effect, and what previous Union generals (and
even Abraham Lincoln himself) did not: The South would fight until it ran out
of will – and that is what precisely happened.
In
his excellent chapter on Civil War Generalship (perhaps the most important
chapter in the book), Keegan notes that the Civil War was fought by amateurs.
Although by the end of the war the Union Army would have been a match for any
European army of the time, Keegan is not impressed with the quality of Civil
War generalship (although in my opinion, he gives Lee too much credit and Jackson not
enough). He calls McClellan “one of the most interesting psychological cases in military
history” (make of that what you will). Although Keegan does not say this in his discussions on Grant and Sherman, in my opinion their great strength as military leaders was in their absolute realism
about what had to be accomplished in order to defeat the South. Grant destroyed
the military manpower of the Confederacy in the Overland Campaign, knowing that he
had virtually unlimited reenforcements to call on, while Sherman attacked the
South’s spirit by breaking into the heartland of Georgia and South Carolina and destroying it. Morality aside, this strategy did not require brilliance to
execute. Keegan’s summation of most Civil War generals, North and South: “…too
much personality in play, and far too little talent.”
As to the causes of the Civil War, they seem to
be somewhat of a mystery to Keegan. He mentions the popularity of the amateur “militias”
of the day as an inciting factor, lighting a fire that quickly roared out of
control. But Keegan compares and contrasts the American Civil War with World
War One, calling it an “unnecessary” war (true enough) but stating that the
American Civil War was NOT unnecessary, that the divisions over slavery were
too deep to be resolved by peaceful means. So, mysterious though the causes of
the Civil War may be, Keegan seems to think that war was unavoidable. Whether
he is correct or not continues to be one of the key questions of American
history.
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