“Why We Were In Vietnam”, by Norman Podhoretz

240 pages, Simon & Schuster, ISBN-13: 978-0671445782

Ready for another blast form the past? I picked up Why We Were In Vietnam by Norman Podhoretz from Avalon Books, one of my go-to used book stores from back in the day that has gone the way of the dodo (thanks, Amazon). Anyway, it was published in 1982 and was Podhoretz’s detailed account of the American domestic political history of the Vietnam War. Podhoretz, an American neoconservative pundit and writer for Commentary magazine, covers the political debate (or lack thereof) at each stage of American involvement in Vietnam; from refusing to enter to help the French, to providing assistance to the independent South, to entering combat, to drawing down, to negotiating an end to US involvement, to refusing to sell the South Vietnamese ammunition for their self-defense – it’s all painfully there. As would be expected from a writer of Podhoretz’s caliber, he is meticulous in his research, quotes and footnotes of the various sides at different times during the war; indeed, one of the drawbacks is that the reading is a bit thick due to the frequent in-depth quotes from sources with different styles, and you may have to re-read a section once in order to make sure the context is correct, but this is a minor quibble.

I believe that Podhoretz’s biggest contention is that the Vietnam War was fought on the cheap; to elaborate his point, Kennedy (yes, Kennedy; for God’s sake stop giving him a pass from starting our involvement just because he was murdered young by a deranged Communist…who acted alone) and Johnson tried to fight the war below the radar of the general public and, therefore, even though most Americans supported our efforts in Vietnam early on, the Presidents never made the case for the war to the public. America was never put on a war-footing, in other words, and Americans at home were not asked to make any sacrifices. This had a deleterious effect on Americans later on during the conflict, when the public mood was shifting (not as you might imagine as the author points out), and political leaders failed to make the case for American involvement. By contrast, extremist elements opposed to the war (and any war, and America itself), were able to gain broad support and mainstream acceptance of their “facts”. Johnson blundered in trying to “not dignify those allegations with a response” and also in trying to fight the war out of the public eye, while simultaneously trying to get his Great Society boondoggle launched, during all of which he squandered his limited credibility. By the time Nixon was elected, the issue of withdrawal was settled (even though there had never really been a debate), with the only questions being timing and method.

Podhoretz spares no one, equally embarrassing those who favored involvement and those who favored withdrawal. He highlights hypocrisy on all sides, across all three administrations and exposes hidden agendas and prejudices galore (he even points out fallacies and errors in his own articles, written during the war; I mean, how’s that for honesty?). There is no question that Podhoretz supported involvement for the right reasons, in the right way, but he carefully draws the distinction between blind support of a poorly lead war effort by a leadership that squandered political opportunities, and support for those in South Vietnam who honestly wanted to remain free from North Vietnamese (read, Communist) domination. This is not an easy book to read, and is not recommended for light reading, either: the reader has to really think about what is being said and the context, but If you want to learn more about politics surrounding American involvement in Vietnam, this book provides critical balance missing in almost all histories of the war.