“The Thirty Years War: Europe’s Tragedy”, by Peter H. Wilson

 

1024 pages, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, ISBN-13: 978-0674036345

If, like me, your introduction to the Thirty Years’ War was through Geoffrey Parker’s The Thirty Years War (reviewed on August 18^th, 2015), then you were left wanting more, for Parker edited what was in effect a grand introduction to this most terrible of European wars, at least until the blood-soaked 20^th Century dawned. In The Thirty Years War: Europe’s Tragedy, author Peter H. Wilson goes farther than Parker by riffing deep into all of the multifarious reasons that led to the outbreak of war, especially the sociopolitical, economic and religious controversies. And no nation is short-changed, either, for while Germany and France are-and-must remain center-stage, Spain, Italy and the Ottoman Empire are represented, as well. This is, perhaps, the definitive history of the Thirty Years’ War.

The historian Otto von Habsburg one wrote an article for the Smithsonian Magazine in which he stated that the German view of their own history is one in which a weak and divided German Nation was easy prey to its strong and united neighbors, who treated the Germans as so much chattel to be used, abused and discarded at will. And when you read about the Thirty Years’ War – about how Germany was transformed into an abattoir as first this kingdom and then latter that kingdom invaded, fought, looted and plundered the numerous German microstates at will – it is hard to argue with this conclusion. This theory also goes a long way to explain the resentment the German people felt after the end of the First World War: just the latest example of Europe having its way with Germany.

Backing up for a minute: I keep saying “Germany” when I mean, of course, the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which was a massive feudal land divided into too-numerous-to-count feudal realms which were in turn lorded over by the House of Habsburg, nominally Archdukes of Austria but whose true power lay in being Emperors over this polyglot realm. But they were not all-powerful, for they were (in theory, at least) answerable to a plethora of institutions that carried their own rights and privileges, the complexity of which is nothing short of extraordinary (i.e. regions, nations, free cities, duchies and so forth, each with their own historical perquisites in the hierarchy). The Emperor, then, could not order or command his lords; rather, he had to entice or threaten them to follow his wishes.

But why did this war break out when it did? Well, according to Wilson, the Ottoman Empire – the Muslim powerhouse that threatened Europe time and again – began its long decline at this moment, thus depriving the continent of its one unifying agent. Emperor Rudolf II was a particularly weak monarch who was a tyrant, to boot, as he attempted to place loyal Catholic administrators throughout the Empire, even in majority Protestant realms (his successor, Emperor Matthias, was no better). The Habsburgs were short on funds after many years of overspending, which deprived them of the means to defend their territories and promote economic stability. And, there were all the new, rising powers to contend with, from a unified France to the Kingdom of Sweden, all of whom were looking for their places in the sun.

Once the war was on, it was at first confined amongst the princes of the Empire as the struggle was between Catholic and Protestant German rulers. However, after the Catholic Habsburgs appeared victorious, the Lutheran Kingdom of Sweden and Catholic Kingdom of France intervened, transforming the internal German conflict into an international one, and the last religious European war in which people were slaughtered for how they worshipped was instead transformed into a good ole’ secular conflict in which people were slaughtered because they were in the way. And from there the war took on a brutal logic all its own, with occupiers wanting territories for their own ends (or seeking to extricate themselves while saving face) and princes hoping to achieve independence of control over their territory or liberty to pursue their faith.

On and on and on it went, with some regions of Germany losing up to 60% of their people (it is estimated that the Holy Roman Empire as a whole lost a third of its population over the course of the conflict). The resolution of the war is perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the whole, signaling as it does the end of the feudal state and the beginning of the nation state. Replacing the personal concerns and egos of princes, entire nations, based on a shared language and culture, entered negotiations roughly as equals with legitimate concerns and interests rather than as members of a feudal hierarchy with set-to obligations. In addition, religious toleration was finally established, after laborious negotiations of rights of minorities to gain legal sanction for their style of worship. In many ways, it was the start of the modern age.

The Thirty Years War: Europe’s Tragedy, then, is an extremely detailed history of this awful conflict. Forewarned is forearmed, for it is not meant for people who are just curious about the war or would lack a basic understanding of what it was about and who won. It gets down to a very granular level, describing troop movements and commanders’ decisions in depth. There is some attempt to discuss developments in military technology, economics, social history and the role of disease in the war, but these topic are not the focus of the book; although these limitations are real, they aren’t fatal. The Thirty Years’ War was very complicated, involving a lot of different parties with different motives, but Wilson never once wilts under the pressure to bring this awful tragedy to life.