“Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis”, by Ian Kershaw

1115 pages, W.W. Norton & Company, ISBN-13: 978-0393049947

Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis by Ian Kershaw is the second and concluding volume of Ian Kershaw’s monumental biography of Hitler. Was he great? asked Joachim Fest in his own Hitler biography, who generously allowed Hitler a kind of “botched greatness”, a sort of monstrous parody of what we expect greatness to be. Other writers have given depth to this portrayal – John Keegan called Hitler’s leadership style “False Heroic”, in contrast to the “Heroic” Alexander the Great, the “Unheroic” Wellington and the “Anti-Heroic” Ulysses S. Grant. As far as I can see Kershaw does not contradict the Bullock or Fest biographies, but rather complements them, and further explains the malignant idea of “working towards the Fuhrer” by which Hitler’s will, rather than his spoken orders, were carried out by his minions across Europe. Kershaw gives an in-depth description of the chaotic Third Reich in which Hitler became the spider in a vast web of intrigue, in-fighting and betrayal. Out of this nexus grew the Final Solution and the Second World War, two of the most fateful events that ever befell the human race.

Kershaw has been criticized in not giving more credence to Hitler's “military genius”, as it has been pointed out that the portrait of “Hitler the military blunderer” is a self-serving one painted by his generals who liked to talk as if they were prevented from winning the war by the mistakes of a rank amateur. True, Hitler was not the clumsy blunderer of legend who by accident won a war against France and by sheer guile almost pulled off the defeat of the Soviet Union. Yet, his successes can also be exaggerated; while there will always be arguments about the success (or otherwise) of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, by Christmas 1941 it was clear that Operation Barbarossa had been no more successful than the Schlieffen Plan. Yet Germany persisted in the same course as it had then, struggling against lengthening odds until final defeat. Similarly, all his diplomatic and political victories were against weak opposition – Hugenberg, von Papen, Dollfuss, Chamberlain, Daladier, the hapless Hacha, even Benes, were not of the caliber of Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt. Yet Hitler behaved as if they were. For all his emphasis on “Will”, his own will failed him in 1940 during the critical struggle with Churchill, on which so much turned.

Hence I think Kershaw’s overall portrayal of Hitler is accurate – for example, he gives Hitler the credit for saving the German army in the winter of 1941 when a precipitate retreat might have turned into a rout (however, if the Germans had been forced to withdraw closer to their borders, they would have been able to repel the Red Army for quite a long time). Hitler’s style was therefore richly suited for circumstances which were in his favor; failing that, he made mistakes, and his emphasis on his “Will” only compounded his errors. Let me add there will be little comfort here for those “revisionist” historians who argue that Churchill betrayed Britain’s interests by not making a deal with the Nazis in 1940; they fail to say which part of the British Empire (whose existence they praise) should have been given up to placate Hitler and his allies (Suez or Egypt to Italy or Vichy France, perhaps, or Gibraltar to Spain?) 

For a brave and decorated soldier, Hitler’s degeneration into the “False Heroic” leader is surprising and, for those who served with him, unexpected. Once, he had the blinds of his carriage pulled down so he would not see wounded German soldiers in an adjacent train. Compare that with Alexander, whose veterans filed past his bed with a last goodbye and whom the dying King acknowledged with a movement of his eyes. Or compare it to Wellington, his duty done, dying honored among his countrymen. Or Napoleon in lonely dignity in his exile. Or Ulysses Grant, struggling with cancer to finish his autobiography so as to leave his family free of crippling debt. One can only say that Hitler received the end he deserved – hidden in a deep bunker he took his own life in manner that had no dignity or honor.

“Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris”, by Ian Kershaw

912 pages, W.W. Norton & Company, ISBN-13: 978-0393046717

Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris by Ian Kershaw draws the reader closer to understanding this historically enigmatic and often bizarre human being who so changed the world of the 20^th Century. Although there are a myriad of such books that have appeared in the half-century-plus since Hitler’s demise in the dust and rubble of Berlin, this particular effort, which draws from hundreds of secondary sources (many of which have never before been cited) paints an authentic and masterful portrait of Hitler as an individual. This is an absolutely singular historical work that will almost certainly displace other, older tomes as the standard text on the early life and rise of Adolph Hitler.

Kershaw takes a quite different and novel approach regarding Hitler’s early years, and it is one I thoroughly enjoyed. Here, by carefully locating and fixing the individual in the context and welter of his times, it yields a much more enlightening approach toward painting a meaningful comprehensive picture of how a neglected and conflicted boy meaningfully became such a terribly flawed and troubled man. Thus we see the boy grow and change in whatever fashion into a man, tracing the rise of this troubled malcontent from the anonymity of Viennese shelters to a fiery and meteoric rise into politics, culminating in his ascent to rule Germany. Kershaw memorably recreates the social, economic, and political circumstances that bent and twisted Hitler so fatefully for the history of the world.

Hitler was, in Kershaw’s estimation, a man most representative of his times, reflecting a widespread disaffection with democratic politics, steeped in the virulent antisemitism of his Viennese environment, twisted and experienced in the cruelties and absurdities of the First World War, thrust by circumstance and disposition into the sectarian, dyspeptic, and rough-and-tumble politics of Wiemar Germany, and rising by finding himself the most unlikely of politicians with an unusual ability to orate and emote. It is also interesting to discover that Hitler had an unusually acute (though uneven) intellect, is rumored to have possessed a photographic memory, and was said to have an amazing ability to discuss and quote facts and figures and then subsequently casually weave them into a conversation that witnesses found spellbinding and convincing. He was also unquestionably quite charismatic and charming (alas).

From the beginning Kershaw argues it is impossible to understand Hitler without understanding this extremely toxic and strange combination of social, economic, and cultural factors that characterized Germany in the post-war era. Thus, by the time he begins his ineluctable rise to power, we much better understand both how and why such a seemingly unlikely cast of characters as the Nazis succeeded so wildly beyond what one would expect to be possible in a sane and sophisticated modern industrial state.

This is fascinating stuff, as is his treatment of the concomitant rise of the slugs, thugs, and under-life accompanying him into the corridors of power and influence. Here is the world’s greatest single collection of otherwise underachieving bullies, fanatics, pseudo-intellectuals, and fellow travelers, who clashed into an uneasy coalescence that formed the nucleus of the single greatest force for collective evil seen in the modern world. One’s mind reels at the scene at the book’s conclusion, as the newly formed Nazi power structure begins applying the progressively strangulating neck-lock on Germany’s Jews, religious leaders, and other “malcontents”, a story that woefully continues in the second volume of this masterful biography.

“A Mighty Fortress: A New History of the German People”, by Steven E. Ozment

432 pages, Harper Perennial, ISBN-13: 978-0060934835

If you’re looking for a detailed cataloging of German history from the early tribes through the modern era, then A Mighty Fortress: A New History of the German People is not the book to read. Ozment is writing to an audience (it seems to me, anyway) that is already somewhat familiar with the major topics, events, and people of German history. That allows him to focus more on certain themes than on details, such as: the relationship between church and state and how it evolved in Germany; obstacles to centralized authority in Germany; how Germans have come to see themselves and foreigners throughout the centuries; the German balance between order and freedom; and, finally, the difficulties of writing about German history for historians in the post-Nazi era. On developing these, I think Ozment does a good job, and overall the book goes into wonderful detail in some areas, needless detail in others, and is painfully vague on the rest.

For example, he writes about seven pages on the Saxon Elector Frederick the Wise, one of Luther’s biggest supporters, while also spending about the same amount on the revolution of 1848, arguably one of the most pivotal events in German – and European – history (although he does refer back to it later, when discussing interwar and post-WW2 German governments). On the other hand, his discussion of Hitler’s rise to power is very well written, giving the reader a better understanding of the conditions in which the Third Reich arose, and what exactly many Germans found appealing about Hitler.

What I enjoyed most about the book was Ozment’s continual discussion of the German balance between individual freedom and autonomy, and the need for strong authority to prevent anarchy and ensure prosperity. Historically, Germans have seen freedom from chaos as being equally important as freedom from tyranny. His analysis of the German reaction to the French Revolution was excellent. He also aptly explains the German multilayered identity, with strong inclinations toward the local and the regional; this had been fostered by centuries-long existence of free cities and powerful dukes and princes. In the centuries when English, French, and Spanish monarchs were becoming more powerful, Germany’s monarchs were often preoccupied with foreign involvement, causing their absence and neglect of German affairs. That allowed Germany’s princes to become even more powerful, partially explaining why the country never centralized the way the others did.

Overall, the book’s analysis of German history is often lopsided, focusing too much on some areas, while being too skimpy with others. But Ozment develops and supports his themes with a well-researched and written book that will, at the end of the day, leave most readers better informed about Germany.