784 pages, Random
House Trade Paperbacks, ISBN-13: 978-0812980660
With
the centennial of the outbreak of World War I come and gone, we should pause to
reflect on the terrible loss that conflict brought. Oh, the cost in lives was
grotesque, make no mistake, but consider, too, the loss in terms of western
culture: 1914 was truly a watershed year that ended one way of life and
introduced another; it also did much to kill the confidence that Europeans had
in themselves and their culture(s), an event the West is still living with
today as Europe is filled with leaders who have not the courage or the
wherewithal to defend their nations, their history or their accomplishments
(indeed, like Leftists on this side of the Atlantic, they seem determined to
degrade all of the above at every opportunity). In The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914, author Margaret
MacMillan attempts to show how the war came about primarily because too many
people either wanted war or did not do enough to prevent it from happening, and
the result is, perhaps, the most thorough analysis of the pre-1914 world
available to the modern reader.
MacMillan
begins her book with an account of the major players – that is, Deutsches
Kaiserreich; Österreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie…and, okay fine, Osztrák-Magyar
Monarchia; République française; Rossiyskaya Imperiya; and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland – to illustrate how each of their national hopes
and dreams (and honor; mustn’t forget honor, must we?) were pitted against their
fears and suspicions, and introduces the reader to the primary individuals who
helped shape national policy. But MacMillan doesn’t end there, as she then
looks at the psychology of war and the peace efforts in the various nations and
around the world and compares them to the militarism that each nation was espousing;
she describes how the new concept of public opinion helped drive the leaders
towards certain decisions, whether for war or for peace (a wonderful revelation
in this work is just how important the publics of the powers forced their
master’s hands; they weren’t all powerless lambs being led to the slaughter,
y’know). Next she looks at the series of dress rehearsals that led to the Great
War’s outbreak: Morocco, Bosnia, the Balkan Wars and even the assassination of
the Austrian archduke and his wife. None of these events meant that war was
ultimately inevitable, for so long as there were at least some key players
willing to negotiate and work through differences war could have been avoided.
MacMillan
concludes that war came about because the forces that sought it outnumbered and
outmaneuvered those who did not, but she also works to debunk myths that have
evolved over the years, the most important being that Germany and Kaiser Bill were
solely responsible for war in 1914, despite what Article 231 of the Treaty of
Versailles – the notorious “War Guilt Clause” – says. Germany had repeatedly
backed down in the face of international pressure during the Morocco crises of
1905 and 1911. The Kaiser, that peculiar admixture of obnoxious blowhard and
sensitive egoist, had a way of standing down at the last minute; granted, he
was fascinated with all things military and he was the inheritor of the long
and proud Prussian military tradition (and the uniforms; scads and scads of
uniforms), but he did not set out to bring war upon the world as he has often
been blamed for doing. MacMillan also critiques the other powers of the time:
the Anglo-French entente that developed after 1904 was not all that it could
have been, as Britain and France were not a unified front for British leaders
continually looked for ways to be non-committal (while also backing France on
international affairs); the relationship between France and Russia – the
republic of free men and women and the most despotic empire in Europe; the
challenges facing Austria-Hungary and its ramshackle and illogical
organization; and, of course, upstart Serbia, the little bastard nation that
began the whole mess. All of these have had myths develop around them, and
MacMillan works through the hyperbole to understand the root causes of national
decisions (in fact, MacMillan ultimately blames no one and everyone for the
war; The Great War – and she uses this term throughout the book – was the sum
total of each government’s unwillingness to resort to diplomacy, just when the
world needed diplomacy the most). MacMillan’s writing style is crisp and
lively; seriously, there is never a dull moment in this book, and if only my college
history classes had books like this I would have kept more of them.
