480 pages, Penguin
Books, ISBN-13: 978-0143128830
If
you ever saw “A Bridge Too Far” – based on the book A Bridge Too Far by Cornelius Ryan – then The Battle of Arnhem: The Deadliest Airborne Operation of World War II
by Antony Beevor will be familiar to you, being as it is a history of Operation
Market Garden. This was the Allied attempt to create a broad salient into
German territory with a bridgehead over the River Rhine, creating an Allied
invasion route into northern Germany through complimentary sub-operations: the
seizing of nine bridges with combined U.S. and British airborne forces (Market)
followed by land forces swiftly following over the bridges (Garden), all taking
place in the Netherlands between September 17th through 25th,
1944. While Market Garden succeeded in liberating the Dutch cities of Eindhoven
and Nijmegen (along with many other towns) and limited V-2 rocket launching
sites, it failed in its principle objective to secure a bridgehead over the
Rhine, with the Allied advance being halted at the river.
As
might be expected, while much is written about victory in war, relatively few
memorialize lives given for lost causes. Even after Market Garden fell to
pieces, the men who fought in Arnhem showed remarkable determination, grit,
bravery and sacrifice. The Allied defeat at Arnhem was as honorable as any
victory – right up there with Dunkirk, I would argue – and Beevor pays it a
worthy tribute while weaving a human story about defeat and the inhumanity of
war. In the world of strategic and military studies, the name Market Garden has
come to signify something of its own: poor planning and confusion, roughly
similar to what those on the battlefield describe as FUBAR (that would be
F***** Up Beyond All Repair). While such associations can sometimes provide
historical reference points, they short-change the human character of battle
when they supplant deeper understandings of war, which is something Beevor
endeavors to undo by placing the heroism and suffering of the soldier at the
forefront of his history.
Beevor
is scathing and unrelenting in his critique of the British commanders, but he doesn’t
really accurately describe the true reason for Field Marshall Bernard Law
Montgomery’s terrible, horrible, no good, very bad plan. Oh, he informs us that
the plan was bad, but leaves it to the reader to imply the true reason for the
horrific plan: namely, that it was never a military plan but rather an attempt
by Monty to regain his position as Allied Ground Commander. This is not to say
that Monty didn’t have a military purpose for the operation, but that the main
reason Monty pushed it was because if it worked, Monty would be top dog. That
was Monty’s priority, not liberating the Netherlands and crossing the Rhine and
capturing the Ruhr on the way to Berlin and ending the war in ’44 and all that.
Monty was absolutely certain that he was the best commander in the Allied
forces – hell, in the whole damn war – and resented that Eisenhower – a YANK –
was his superior. If Operation Market Garden has succeeded, he no doubt would
have made a push to oust Ike.
And
a bad plan with bad commanders it was. Beevor points out repeatedly that the Koninklijke Militaire Academie – the
Dutch Royal Military Academy – had, in fact, war gamed this very scenario of
the single highway advance prior to the war, but without the airborne element;
any cadet who attempted Monty’s strategy was always given a failing grade. And
what was attempted? Market (the largest airborne operation of the war to date)
dropped the British 1st Airborne Division, the American 82nd
Airborne Division, the American 101st Division and the Polish 1st
Parachute Brigade on six major water crossings in order to seize and hold them
until, Garden (the ground component) advanced up a single raised highway with
boggy land on either side for much of the way that wasn’t suitable for tanks to
operate upon, led by the British XXX Corps. In such a situation, a smaller German
force could (and did) hold up a larger British force for hours, and as it would
turn out, the Germans would repeatedly attack the highway.
From
that fatally flawed start, Beevor makes clear that things only got worse: there
weren’t enough planes to drop all the troops in one drop; there weren’t going
to be two drops on the same day to start off; Allied Air command wouldn’t let
troops drop close to the bridges in many instances; other commanders gave
greater priority to protecting their flanks from German attack than capturing
the bridges; the British corps commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Brian Gwynne
Horrocks, was still suffering from wounds he’d received during the Italian
campaign, potentially affecting his judgment; the Airborne Corps Commander, Lieutenant-General
Sir Frederick Arthur Montague “Boy” Browning, was also a disaster, taking up 38
gliders in the first lift for his HQ for what would be a battle fought at the
divisional and lower level by the airborne units; and the commander of the
British 1st Airborne had never made an airborne assault, never
really understanding the difference between how an airborne unit and a regular
division would operate.
And
then the actual assault took place, where things got even worse (if you can
imagine). Major General Robert Elliot “Roy” Urquhart, the British 1st
Airborne commander, would exit his HQ, thus leaving his division leaderless for
crucial hours when he was trapped behind enemy lines; the distance to the
bridges delayed their capture, allowed the demolition of the first bridge and,
in the vital case of the Rhine bridge at Arnhem, only a small force made it to
the bridge itself; there were the radios, as the British at Arnhem couldn’t
communicate with their home base or even with the Allied fighters who were
supposed to be listening for calls to attack ground targets (worse, Beevor
relates the many witnesses to the sluggish nature of the British ground
advance, and not only because of German defenders, but the 9-to-5 soldiering
attitude of the British). Anything and everything that could go wrong did go
wrong, but if the planning, organization and leadership had all been better,
then perhaps – just perhaps – something may have been salvaged.
Beevor
is unsparing in his criticism of this hastily thrown together plan and it’s
terrible execution, while at the same time giving full accounts of the incredible
bravery of so many involved, whether British, American, Polish or Dutch, and
even German. Where Beevor surpasses Ryan is in telling the aftermath of the
attempt and the terrible consequences the Dutch population would suffer as a
result. Beevor also makes clear how badly the 1st (Polish)
Independent Parachute Brigade was treated, especially its commander,
Major-General Stanisław Franciszek Sosabowski, who would be removed after the
battle as the commander it what appears to have been an attempt by Gens. Browning
and Horrocks to scapegoat him for the failure of Market Garden. God knows there
was plenty of blame to spread around, and after reading The Battle of Arnhem, you’ll want to know why more heads didn’t
roll.