368
Pages, Greenhill Books, ISBN-13: 978-1853676444
1805 Austerlitz:
Napoleon and the Destruction of the Third Coalition is a very thorough and detailed
account of perhaps Napoleon’s greatest victory (and certainly the one he was
most proud of). The author writes of how the battle came about by the failure
of the treaty of Amiens and the formation of the third coalition against France
before moving on to cover the pre-battle tactical and political maneuvering of
the major personalities involved, with both sides attempting to put their
forces into position to ultimately achieve decisive victory. However, it was
Napoleon that was able read his Russian and Austrian opponents rashness and
enticed them to draw off the bulk of their forces to attack his right flank and
leaving the dominant Pratzen heights vulnerable to attack by the French.
The
battle itself is well covered off with the author detailing the movement of
forces and blow-by-blow account of the battle; in fact, the detail is such that
it sometimes hard to take it all in, but thankfully the author had the
foresight to use maps to show the movement of forces at various places and
times of battle so the reader can better visualize his narrative. Goetz also makes
use of some firsthand accounts that give weight to his own explanation of the battle.
The
author suggests that was perhaps the French tactical prowess in the field
(after months of training at Camp Boulogne in anticipation of the invasion of
Britain) that gave the French the edge. This was demonstrated repeatedly by the
effectiveness of their musketry, their cool maneuvering under fire, effective
coordination of combined arms operations, larger scale maneuvers, and a superb
discipline produced by high morale and complete confidence in their commanders.
The French command-and-control system also had flexibility, enabling field commanders
to adapt and maneuver their forces to changing situations to achieve ultimate
mission objectives. The Russian and Austrian forces typically seemed to be
locked and awaiting orders from above losing valuable time and few officers
used their initiative. Having said that, the Russians and Austrians fought hard
and bravely and at times were able to throw the French back. In the end,
however, it was Napoleon’s careful planning, use of detailed information about
the enemy and terrain, and the ability to achieve numerical superiority at a
given point that led to his decisive victory.