432
pages, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, ISBN-13: 978-0618349654
We
have grown accustomed to viewing the World Wars of the 20th Century
as the first total wars in modern history, for they required the total
mobilization and militarization of the societies involved. Their accompanying
ideologies – Fascism, Nazism, Communism – were appropriately called
totalitarian since they left no aspect of society unaffected. But historian
David Avrom Bell in The First Total War:
Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It has written a new
and different history of the Napoleonic Wars (1792 – 1815) arguing that they
were in fact the first total wars.
In
his introduction, Bell tells us that he is borrowing techniques from
intellectual history to write a military history. Traditionally military
historians have restricted themselves to accounts of battlefield tactics and
weapon systems, but in his book Bell is attempting to go further in showing
that the ideals of the Enlightenment played a role in what he calls the first
total war. He believes that the French Revolution – the apotheosis of the
Enlightenment – radicalized people’s ideas about how and why wars should be
fought. During the time of the Ancien
Régime (which is Bell's main standard of comparison) wars were limited and
short-lived and were fought according to established rules and usually to
defend the honor of this or that aristocrat; in fact, many times the armies involved
were made up of mercenaries who fought for pay rather than honor or, much less,
patriotism. The philosophes of the
Enlightenment such as Kant, Diderot, d’Alembert, and the Marquis de Condorcet
were certain that with the advent of reason wars would be a thing of the past.
As late as 1790 Robespierre was declaring in the Assembly that the French
nation had no desire to engage in war, that to invade another country and make
it adopt their laws and constitution was the furthest thing from their minds.
Much
changed in two years: by 1792 there was growing opposition to the revolutionary
government in Paris, especially in the Vendée region of western France. The
government decided to put down this rebellion with a degree of brutality not
seen before and conducted a scorched-earth policy that spared no one, making no
distinction between combatants and non-combattants. The dogs of war had been
unleashed to save the revolution and to obliterate any dissent. Bell explores
the nature of total war and how it feeds on itself. Once the military becomes
front and center of the government, war becomes unstoppable, and in the case og
Ferance, all of the nation’s resources and efforts went to the Grande Armée to
create an empire in places as far as Egypt and Russia.
In
his retelling of the Spanish campaign, Bell attempts to draw a parallel with
America’s intervention in Iraq, and to an extent there are some parallels.
Napoleon claimed to be bringing Enlightenment ideals and reform to Spain, yet
the insurgency would have none of it. This, however, is a distraction from Bell’s
thesis; whatever else it did in Iraq, America didn’t conducting a total war; it
was, rather, a very restrained and cautious use of military power. In fact,
Napoleon’s excursion into Spain was somewhat cautious to be called total war.
When
contrasted with what transpired in the preceding century and what the philosophes predicted, the Napoleonic
Wars were barbaric and total, but it is still not clear how they were different
from, say, the Mongol invasions of the Middle Ages or the military expeditions
of Alexander the Great. Its seems that the so-called total wars of Napoleon
have been conducted before. The total mobilization of people and resources is
as old as human history. Mutual and absolute hatred for the enemy is a timeless
emotion. Bell’s argument that hell hath no fury like a citzen’s army is reminiscent
of Victor Davis Hanson’s thesis in Carnage and Culture, and it is as
unconvincing.
Bell’s
book provides much food for thought on how quickly circumstances can change
from permanent peace to permanent war without pinpointing exactly what triggers
the change. Paranoia, perceived threat, and survival are all factors in the
devolution of high ideals to base hostility – and why armies of citizens driven
by Enlightenment ideals fight more effectively than previous armies is still
unanswered. However, Bell makes a robust effort with this original work.
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