703
pages, William Morrow & Co., ISBN-13: 978-0688046453
First
published in 1985 and, hence, dated, Fidel:
A Critical Portrait by Tad Szulc is still an exhaustive (700+ pages) and encompassing
work, but, sadly, full of weaknesses from start to finish, such as vague
references to unidentifiable sources, striking generalizations, and a lack of
solid historical background. But perhaps the basic problem is that the author
seems reluctant to renounce old illusions about Castro and his revolution, and
thus his criticisms (and he does have some) are softened throughout by a flow
of praise.
Szulc
submerges many of the negative aspects of Castro’s character in an interminable
paean to his charisma, energy, wisdom, courage, and generosity. More than 200
pages are devoted by Szulc to a loving description of Castro’s early years, only
54 to his “maturity”; the reader is thus spared no detail of the Fidel legend.
We are told repeatedly that he has been brave since childhood, has a splendid
memory, an overwhelming personality, and encyclopedic knowledge. Castro, Szulc
writes, can dazzle bishops with his theological arguments, economists with his
command of statistics, intellectuals with philosophical insight, and gourmets
with recipes. Such a scholar is he that during the guerrilla campaigns in the
mountains he sometimes issued his orders in Latin! True, Szulc concedes, Castro
is a poor poet, but even so he won a first prize in poetry once by simply
charming the jury. In short, by Szulc’s account Castro deserves to bear the
motto of a Spanish knight of the 16th Century: Excedió a todos en todo; he exceeds everyone in everything.
Despite
his unbounded admiration, Szulc does, it is true, adduce enough facts to
demolish most of the Castro legend. He is especially forthcoming with evidence
that exposes the absolute falsehood of one of the most durable myths of the
Cuban revolution: the notion that it was the lack of understanding and support
from the United States that pushed Castro into the Soviet embrace. Szulc
demonstrates that from the very beginning, Castro had no intention of establishing
a democratic government in Cuba. He carefully hid his true political
intentions, going to such lengths, immediately after victory, as to establish a
secret government to control Cuba. His clash with the United States was a
coldly calculated move to reinforce and justify his personal power. To be sure,
errors committed by Washington eased the process, but Castro’s goal had been
set well in advance. In view of the evidence provided by Szulc, it can be
argued that it was Castro who pushed the Soviet Union into the Caribbean and
not the other way around.
It
is a pity that after supplying all this valuable information on the colossal
deceit perpetrated by Castro, Szulc avoids examining the most tragic
consequence of that deceit. Many Cubans who believed Castro’s democratic
promises paid dearly for the trust they placed in him. After his victory, leaders
of the rebel army and members of the 26th of July Movement, labor
leaders, and underground fighters, all found themselves facing firing squads or
in prison, branded “traitors” by the leader who had betrayed them. Szulc knows
this. He mentions some names from a long list of revolutionaries who were
punished for remaining loyal to the initial promises made by Castro. He even
alludes to the difference between the treatment meted out to political
prisoners in Castro’s Cuba and the treatment Fidel himself received in
Batista’s prisons, where he was allowed to read voraciously, to cook his own
food, and to receive visitors. But he suspends judgment on this difference,
preferring to remind us again of Fidel’s inner generosity and charisma. He
cannot, however, avoid a note of melancholy in his final, summary chapter on
the last 20 years in Cuba (circa 1985), and that inevitably somber tone may
perhaps be more significant than anything else in the book.
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