774
pages, Da Capo Press, ISBN-13: 978-0306811371
I know,
I know, I know…ANOTHER book on Napoleon and how he raised a whole lotta hell
over a couple of decades before being forced into permanent retirement on St.
Helena at the insistence of Europe. In what is intended as the first volume in
a new and comprehensive four-volume study of Napoleon and Europe (which, as of
this writing, have yet to be written), The
End of the Old Order: Napoleon and Europe, 1801-1805 by Frederick W. Kagan is
a fresh, clear interpretation of the events that brought about the War of the
Third Coalition in 1805, the flaws in the Coalition’s plans and how Napoleon exploited
those weaknesses and emerged victorious. One interesting reinterpretation of
the facts is Kagan’s thesis that it was the mistakes made by European nations,
and not Napoleon’s brilliance, that lead to France dominating Europe in the
first decade of the 19th Century. This is just one obvious instance
of Kagan refusing to fall into any sort of Napoleonic hero-worship; certainly,
he recognizes Napoleon’s genius, but then again Napoleon’s faults are on full display,
while all of the other Kings, Emperors, generals and diplomats are treated to
equally balanced examinations, as well.
Kagan states
that the distrust among Britain, Prussia, Austria and Russia made them form an
alliance too late to stop The Ogre; in Prussia’s case especially, as she opted
out until the very last moment. Kagan is especially critical of Tsar Alexander
I for alienating potential allies by his overly idealistic vision of postwar
Europe in which both Prussia and Austria would have diminished power in
exchange for greater influence over the smaller states in Central Europe – and a
power vacuum into which Russia would step, or course. Kagan is also critical of
Austrian leadership for putting too many soldiers in Italy instead of Germany,
and at General Mack for not withdrawing his overextended forces from Ulm; also,
Archduke Charles failed to move sufficient forces from Italy to help Mack in
Germany in time. Kagan is especially harsh on Tsar Alexander I for
overextending his forces in Italy, around Prussia and the Balkans while failing
to concentrate them in southern Germany in order to cooperate better with the
Austrians. Even the great victory at Austerlitz is examined in detail with an
eye to balance and recognition that had a few chess pieces been otherwise
placed the outcome could have been different. The result of the climactic
battle is not just wrapped with a brief review of peace terms but, like the
causes of the war, the road to Preßburg and Schönbrunn are examined in detail
before being signed off and summarized in the closing pages.
Kagan
does an excellent job at balancing Napoleon and his effect on the world, both
for good and for ill. No hero-worshiper he who sees all that Napoleon did as
good and right, neither is he a revisionist who damns Napoleon as The Ogre of
British children’s nightmares. I really hope Kagen gets it together and writes
the remaining volumes of his narrative; if the first is anything to go by it
should be an exhaustive and balanced history of one of the most tempestuous and
consequential eras in European, to say nothing of World, history…but seeing as
this book was first published in 2006 and I haven’t seen hide nor hair of the
other three supposed books in this serious, I’m not holding my breath.
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