240
pages, Simon & Schuster, ISBN-13: 978-0671445782
Ready for another blast form the
past? I picked up Why We Were In Vietnam
by Norman Podhoretz from Avalon Books, one of my go-to used book stores from
back in the day that has gone the way of the dodo (thanks, Amazon). Anyway, it
was published in 1982 and was Podhoretz’s detailed account of the American
domestic political history of the Vietnam War. Podhoretz, an American
neoconservative pundit and writer for Commentary
magazine, covers the political debate (or lack thereof) at each stage of
American involvement in Vietnam; from refusing to enter to help the French, to
providing assistance to the independent South, to entering combat, to drawing
down, to negotiating an end to US involvement, to refusing to sell the South
Vietnamese ammunition for their self-defense – it’s all painfully there. As
would be expected from a writer of Podhoretz’s caliber, he is meticulous in his
research, quotes and footnotes of the various sides at different times during
the war; indeed, one of the drawbacks is that the reading is a bit thick due to
the frequent in-depth quotes from sources with different styles, and you may
have to re-read a section once in order to make sure the context is correct,
but this is a minor quibble.
I believe that Podhoretz’s biggest
contention is that the Vietnam War was fought on the cheap; to elaborate his
point, Kennedy (yes, Kennedy; for God’s sake stop giving him a pass from
starting our involvement just because he was murdered young by a deranged
Communist…who acted alone) and Johnson tried to fight the war below the radar
of the general public and, therefore, even though most Americans supported our
efforts in Vietnam early on, the Presidents never made the case for the war to
the public. America was never put on a war-footing, in other words, and
Americans at home were not asked to make any sacrifices. This had a
deleterious effect on Americans later on during the conflict, when the public
mood was shifting (not as you might imagine as the author points out), and political
leaders failed to make the case for American involvement. By contrast,
extremist elements opposed to the war (and any war, and America itself), were
able to gain broad support and mainstream acceptance of their “facts”. Johnson
blundered in trying to “not dignify those allegations with a response” and also
in trying to fight the war out of the public eye, while simultaneously trying to
get his Great Society boondoggle launched, during all of which he squandered
his limited credibility. By the time Nixon was elected, the issue of withdrawal
was settled (even though there had never really been a debate), with the only
questions being timing and method.
Podhoretz
spares no one, equally embarrassing those who favored involvement and
those who favored withdrawal. He highlights hypocrisy on all sides, across all
three administrations and exposes hidden agendas and prejudices galore (he even
points out fallacies and errors in his own articles, written during the war; I
mean, how’s that for honesty?). There is no question that Podhoretz supported
involvement for the right reasons, in the right way, but he carefully draws the
distinction between blind support of a poorly lead war effort by a leadership
that squandered political opportunities, and support for those in South Vietnam
who honestly wanted to remain free from North Vietnamese (read, Communist) domination.
This is not an easy book to read, and is not recommended for light reading, either: the
reader has to really think about what is being said and the context, but If you
want to learn more about politics surrounding American involvement in Vietnam,
this book provides critical balance missing in almost all histories of the war.