344
pages, Cambridge University Press, ISBN-13: 978-0521584364
The
world watched in surprise as Prussia easily defeated Austria in the Austro-Prussian War (1866), nearly annihilating the Austrian army at the Battle of Königgrätz.
The new Prussian breech-loading rifle – the Dreyse Needle Gun (or Zündnadelgewehr) – allowed the Prussian
forces an overwhelming superiority in fire power over the slower muzzle-loading
weapons of the Austrian army. In addition, Prussian “swarm” infantry tactics (which
called for units advancing in supporting skirmish lines until they overlapped
the enemy’s flanks) confused the Austrians. Lastly, the Prussians had
completely revised their tactics regarding the use of artillery, allowing
batteries to be quickly moved and concentrated anywhere on the field of battle,
pulverizing enemy forces. Military strategists all over the world analyzed the
conflict and tried to adapt their doctrine to the new style of waging war
introduced by the Prussians.
And
then, it was the turn of France.
The
Franco-Prussian War forever changed the social, political and economic balance
in Europe. The major European powers were stunned as the military might of
France was devastated by a newly united Germany, and the seeds were sown for
the constant political maneuvering and arms race that lasted until the start of
the First World War. France was largely caught unprepared when war came in
mid-July 1870, even though war with Prussia had nearly occurred every year
since 1866. Prussian leaders – King Wilhelm Hohenzollern and the Statesman Otto
von Bismarck – were motivated by a desire for revenge against France stemming
from the Napoleonic Wars, the possibility of regaining Alsace and Lorraine,
formerly German territory, and providing a national motive for uniting Prussia
and the independent German States. The French sought to “keep Prussia in its
place” and maintain France's position as the leading power in Europe.
The
French defeat was owed as much to deficiencies on the part of the French
themselves as it was to Prussian superiority. Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte III
was corrupt, indecisive, and unschooled in military matters. France’s generals
had a penchant for political infighting and bitter rivalry, created in large
part by the Emperor’s habit of passing over senior officers to promote his
friends and supporters, subordinating the more experienced commanders to their
juniors. France’s generals also were indoctrinated to believe that their strength
lay in defense rather than attack, and French officers repeatedly passed up
opportunities to attack and destroy smaller or weaker Prussian units, even when
French forces were overwhelmingly superior.
Organizationally,
the French had a larger professional army than Prussia, as well as a developed system
of reserves. The French army, however, proved to be poorly disciplined and the
reserve system was wholly inadequate, as were mobilization plans, railways,
etc. The Prussian army, though smaller, was better educated and trained, and
backed up by a vast, quickly mobilized reserve. The one bright spot for France was
their superb infantry rifle, the Chassepot. This powerful breech-loading rifle
had double the effective range of the Prussian Dreyse, allowing the French
troops to cut Prussian infantry to pieces before they closed. Unfortunately for
the French, the Prussians more than offset this advantage with their
overwhelming artillery, blasting French units to pieces under a rain of high
explosive shells.
Aside
from the discussion of the actual fighting, Mr. Wawro treats all the facets of
this brief but bloody struggle, from personal accounts of soldiers of both
antagonists and the foreign observers and reporters of the conflict (which
included US General Phillip Sheridan) to the Republican rebellion after the
Prussian capture of Emperor Napoleon. For those interested in military or
European history this book is a must have!
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