“Hannibal: The General from Carthage”, by Ernle Bradford

416 pages, Dorset Press, ISBN-13: 978-0880296670

Hannibal: The General from Carthage is a standard biography of the Carthaginian military leader. The writing is fine and the story line (if one can use that term for a non-fiction book) is interesting: despite an (apparently) unending series of tactical and operational successes, Hannibal loses the war against Rome, due primarily to strategic considerations outside of his control (i.e., Carthage should never have taken on this war unless they had changed their approach substantially). There are lessons here for modern generals (sometimes, despite having the smartest leaders, the best trained and most experienced troops, cutting-edge military technology, the wealthiest society in the known world supporting you, and pretty good luck (to boot), it’s just not enough) – well, I could go on here for a long time, but will refrain from doing so. Although perfectly enjoyable, the book suffers from two major shortcomings: The sources used on Hannibal’s life are only Roman, but this is because there simply are no other sources of information. The author recognizes this explicitly, and tries to balance the Roman accounts with “common sense” interpretations and a modern understanding of the situation. Also, there is an absence of sufficient maps. Repeatedly throughout the book, the author uses phrases such as “Hannibal marched to (this town), then to (that town), while the Romans marched to (someplace else)”; these towns generally don’t appear in modern atlases, and there is no further description in the book (is it on the coast? in the mountains? north? south" east? west?). Without any additional guidance, this is simply useless information. One is tempted to believe that the author has read this information in source materials, but never bothered to discover what it actually meant (could this be true? Nah). It’s more likely that the publisher was unwilling to spring for a couple of pennies per book to provide the maps (or that the author couldn’t be bothered to spend the couple of weeks necessary to get them included). In any case, it’s a shame, and detracts from an otherwise adequate book.

“The Napoleonic Wars (Cassell History of Warfare)”, by Gunther Rothenberg

224 pages, Cassell, ISBN-13: 978-0304352678

Napoleon Bonaparte influenced warfare more than any other figure of his age, and arguably more than any other figure of history. He almost conquered Europe and his influence spread through society in a myriad of ways, from sugar beet production (which he stimulated) to tactics (which he influenced but did not reinvent). The Napoleonic Wars, part of a series put out by the publisher Cassell called the Cassell History of Warfare, concentrates on the military aspects of his influence, and the wars he beget over the last dozen years of his influence, 1803-15. Rothenberg is one of the better-known historians of the Napoleonic age, and his main point here – and he’s made the point elsewhere – is that the Napoleonic Wars weren’t the last wars of the classical age, but the first ones of the modern one (I would argue that in ways they were both, but that’s more of a nuance than an actual difference of opinion). The points he makes are generally well-reasoned, and the narrative tends to support them.

This is a good, crisp read for those who are interested in learning about the military campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte. The period in question covers the years from the 1790s to 1815 and it summarizes each major battle very succinctly. The maps are quite remarkable, and if you’re like me, sometimes they distract you from following the narrative as you want to examine them so closely. This book also examines the key military figures on both sides, most notably Napoleon, of course, but also some of the allied commanders, such as Wellington, Archduke Charles, and others. Napoleon’s marshals also get a fair amount of attention; the author likes to size them up for their talents and weaknesses as commanders, as he does for Napoleon and others. As history reveals time and again, occasionally a remarkable leader emerges who seems to shine above all others, but no matter how great he or she may become (in actuality or in perception), they too eventually fall. Such is the case with Napoleon, but that’s part of what makes reading history so interesting.

Rothenberg believes these wars may not have marked a major technological shift in warfare, but the scale and mobilization efforts launched by nations had changes significantly as a result of Napoleon. This is not a comprehensive study of the Napoleonic period, but nor was it intended to go beyond the military aspects.

“So Far from God: The U.S. War With Mexico, 1846-1848”, by John S.D. Eisenhower

436 pages, Random House, ISBN-13: 978-0394560519

Mexican-American War has been given little attention by historians, possibly because the victory has become tainted with the passage of time, or because the subsequent American Civil War overshadowed it so. In the succeeding Century the war assumed the mantle of a calculated move by an emerging power to steal land from a weaker and defenseless neighbor; in reality, the issues involved in this war were far more complex, yet historians disconcerted by the easy victory have declined to fully examine the background leading to the conflict.

In the 1840s Mexico was nation of contrasts; remnants of Spanish imperialism juxtaposed against the backwardness of a native population. The Mexican officers’ corps was a highly educated and strong force in Mexican politics that were supremely confident of the outcome in any conflict with the United States. Unfortunately, they commanded untrained, albeit brave, troops. This attitude of elitism by the Mexican Army officers ultimately proved disastrous in the war with the United States. The Mexican government resisted all blandishments for a peaceful solution as they considered the United States a second-rate power with little enthusiasm for war. Their mistrust of American motives began with the Texas question and was heightened because of the recent intervention by American officials in the internal affairs of California. Mexicans entered the war with confidence and with the feeling that right was on their side. The war resulted in thousands of deaths from shot and shell, disease and neglect. Mexico sank into the turmoil and distrust bequeathed to a defeated nation. They were racked by recriminations and political divisions that have impaired a just relationship with the United States to this day. The United States, in contrast, became a two-ocean power; the dominant country on the continent of the Americas, and an aggressive nation that began to enforce its sovereignty against Great Britain, France, Russian, and any other interloper in the western hemisphere.

John S.D. Eisenhower’s analysis refutes any question of a peaceful settlement. Mexico was too proud and the United States wanted too much. The issues were fairly clear cut and concerned the continued expansion of the United States through sparsely populated areas ostensibly under Mexican control. There had been prior discussions with Mexico over land acquisitions. Money was offered along with mild threats – both coupled with promises not to interfere further into Mexican affairs. Mexican pride proved unyielding. With their defeat, Mexico paid the ultimate price assessed by a victor nation against a loser; loss of territory and the breakup of a national identity. The war also provided a rich cast of characters that dominated the American political scene for decades. The conflict proved a training ground for the Civil War and many future army generals from the Union and Confederate sides bloodied themselves against the Mexicans. The war with Mexico obliquely led to the Civil War and provided a bevy of “heroes” from which future American presidents were chosen.

This is a well-written account of the Mexican-American conflict is a fascinating story of the war with Mexico. It covers the political as well as military aspects from the Mexican advance into Texas to the eventual purchase of California and New Mexico. The military dominance of Mexico's world-class cavalry and armed forces contrasts vividly with the greedy and egotistical leadership of Santa Anna. Eisenhower does much to dispel the myths and impressions I remember from grade school history, and Texans and Californians especially should find this work extremely interesting. I was, however, left wanting about Santa Anna; he is, to my knowledge, only known leader of a country that led a revolt and overthrew himself. You can’t make this stuff up.