368
pages, Viking Books, ISBN-13: 978-0670459889
With
The Mask of Command Keegan returns
from the raw shellshock of combat and furnishes four accounts of famous
military leaders; his focus, however, is not on strategic or tactical
decisions, but on how these men led, the theatre and persona that these leaders
cultivated to provide the trust and moral fiber which motivated their men. This
is what Keegan means by “The Mask”; the image, the spirit, the incarnation of
what subordinates needed to believe in order to fight. It is in some sense
combative to claim that this persona is a Mask – that is, an artifice contrived
to motivate and not strictly who these leaders “were”. To some extent, it is
impossible to know what any historical figure actually “was” or simply what we
even “are”, but in any event, these particular leaders had very interesting
masks and Keegan does a superb job in each account.
Clearly,
if a leader is to be effective he must have the respect and trust of his men.
The problem is that the mechanisms for gaining this respect are either fraught
with personal peril, require the embodiment of a cause which is rarely
stain-free, or rest upon a non-trivial ideological framework. The simplest
starting point, then, is to answer Keegan's question, “in front: always,
sometimes, or never”. “In front” always has the advantage of pressing home the
point to the men that the leader is bold, unafraid to assume the same risks as
his men for a purpose in which he must clearly believe; it also has the
disadvantage of placing the leader in mortal danger. So a complication arises,
namely, that good leaders are rare and precious, that losing them does a
belligerent no good, but that to eschew personal risk is to court mistrust.
Alexander, Keegan’s first case study, chose “always” and was able to do so in
part because early warfare did not have the lethality of later warfare – arrows
rarely hit their mark and skill at arms could tell in the local heat of combat.
Alexander could thus afford it, but he too felt it incumbent to act more and
more heroically – i.e., to take increasingly greater risks the more he demanded
of his men, finally risking too much and losing his life. Wellington opted for “sometimes”,
rushing about from regiment to regiment at Waterloo, courting stray musket
balls and grapeshot at every turn, exhorting and directing at all times. Still,
he did not lead from the front, which was probably a wise decision when
impersonal bullets could kill men in swaths. Grant more-or-less chose “never”,
as did Hitler.
The
issue then arises for all leaders, but especially for those leaders who chose “never”,
to find other means of gaining trust and belief. Alexander would engage in
dramatic antics, spending days in his tent in peevish anticipation of apology,
and would don fabulous armor for engagements. Oration and rhetoric were vital
to his success as he attempted to hearten at least a portion of his men.
Wellington cultivated the persona of the stoic gentleman warrior, an iron will
of perfection, fair to all but intolerant of sloppiness. Grant cultivated the
image of being “one of the boys” – surrounding himself with home-town friends,
spurring his men by honestly showing them his hangdog vulnerability, and by
relying on his men’s belief in the justice of the Union cause (they were, after
all, citizen-soldiers, volunteers, men of conviction).
Hitler’s
leadership required the constant bolstering of a seductive ideology, endless
infusions of propaganda. Belief in his command was cemented by the ceaseless
exhortations of Goebbels. Like the uncreative and largely ineffective generals
of WWI, Hitler hid in secret bunkers while his men died far away. That Hitler
could get away with it for so long and so successfully was largely due to the
dramatic improvements in communications, but also through the constant
retelling of the Fuhrer's heroism in WWI. Ultimately, Hitler was not a hero,
but a false god whose command withered with the monstrous dream of the Third
Reich and his distance from the realities of the front. Here, Keegan does a
particularly fine job detailing Hitler’s neurotic infantilism, his growing
separation from reality, his insecure sense of isolation, and his final
ignominious demise.
The
text effortless weaves these historical perspectives into a short, concise
study of leadership styles and requirements and then presents a clear thesis on
leadership in the nuclear age. This thesis is truly terrifying in light of the
implications of history; our origins appear to contradict the requirements for
future survival. This text is as much a study in leadership and management
styles as it is a military science text. It is well written and highly
enjoyable. If only we could get Dr. Keegan to add an addendum to leadership in
the age of stateless terror.
No comments:
Post a Comment