722
pages, St. Martin’s Press, ISBN-13: 978-0312193225
There
is an intriguing puzzle at the center of the Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India: How did a relatively
tiny island nation many thousands of miles away subjugate and then for a
century rule a subcontinent populated by hundreds of millions of natives with a
proud history of self-government, literature, architecture, and warfare? James
suggests that two factors above all enabled this improbable conquest of
Britannia in India: 1st, the native cultures of the subcontinent had
long respected and remained loyal to centralized authority (e.g. the caste
system), so long as that power was overwhelming and appeared destined to win; thus,
from beginning to end, the Raj rested on a tenuous foundation of prestige and a
ruthless display of authority, for any threat to the guarded image of British
invincibility threatened the entire enterprise. 2nd, the Raj was
able to effectively divide-and-conquer as the upper castes and the rural princes
were given a privileged, relatively secure role in the Raj while the lower
orders ostensibly benefited from the peace and stability that British influence
brought to India. James stresses that the British could only have succeeded
with widespread and determined native collaboration, a fact that still rankles
contemporary Indian self-consciousness.
In
the end, James maintains that the Raj was unmade mainly by the British
themselves. On the one hand, the empire failed to emulate the practices of the
Romans, who offered conquered peoples the ability to eventually enter Roman
public life on a level plane. The author notes continuously how highly talented
and generally loyal Indians were stymied by British contumacy. In support of
this claim, James chronicles the use of the “n-word” by the British and how it
seemed to spread with each successive generation of British overlordship. On
the other hand, the nature of the Raj was powerfully influenced by domestic
political changes in England in the late 1880s. The British presence and
conduct in India had no more vigilant and strident critic than Labor MPs back
in London.
A
major side theme of Raj is the 19th
Century cold war between England and Russia that we know today as “The Great
Game”. A simple syllogism underpinned the British commitment to India and
likewise motivated Russian foreign policy: Britain was strong and affluent
because of the Empire; the Empire would be nothing without India; Britain would
not be strong and affluent if India was lost. James sees the whole
Russo-British contest as a farce. He compares it to the chess strategy known as
“Maskirovka” a ploy to hide one’s true focus by threatening a perceived
weakness (James suggests that British India played the same role in 19th
Century Russian foreign policy as Cuba did in the mid-20th). James
argues that the true national interest of the Tsars was always Constantinople
and the Balkans; the much ballyhooed central Asian invasion route to India was
a mere diversionary tactic. Thus, James sees “masterly inactivity” as clearly
the right approach to British foreign policy, not the so-called forward school.
It
is also worth noting that James is positively hostile toward Gandhi: “For all
his public humility, Gandhi was at heart a vain man who wanted Indian freedom
on his own terms and through his own methods…Gandhi was also a consummate
showman and a shrewd politician, with a knack projecting himself in such a way
as to attract the greatest possible attention in India and abroad…even [his]
now familiar loin clothes was a prop in a well-though-out piece of political
stagecraft”. It takes a bold man to shred so thoroughly one of the few national
leaders to emerge from the 20th Century with their reputation fully
intact and growing by the decade. The only person who is attacked more
consistently than Gandhi is the last viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten. He is
described as vain, overly ambitious, self-absorbed, and the worst thing a
British official in India could be, impartial (in this case, to the Hindu cause
as represented by Gandhi and Nehru). James places the death of several hundred
thousand Hindus and Muslims in Punjab during partition in 1947 squarely at
Mountbatten’s feet for his lack of effort in preventing the sectarian violence.
This
is not a perfect book, but there are great chapters and its overall approach is,
I think, commendable. I appreciated his view on Gandhi as a good antidote to
the hagiographical view so often expressed (I have always had reservations
about a man who thought the thing to do was drink his own urine!) but I have
seldom seen footnotes so non-revealing (sometimes the name given in the
footnote was not in the bibliography). But it is an interesting story James
tells, one that is not told often or accurately enough.
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