584
pages, Basic Books, ISBN-13: 978-1597401654
Although
there were notable forerunners, spaceflight historiography came of age with the
1985 publication of …the Heavens and the
Earth: A Political History of the Space Age by Walter A. McDougall. Winner
of the Pulitzer Prize and a host of other well-deserved awards, this work provides
a fascinating glimpse of the considerations taken within both the Eisenhower Administration
and the Khrushchev regime regarding the orbital realm. Unlike other author’s
paeans to Kennedy for his ultimately successful manned lunar program, Professor
McDougall renders a more sympathetic assessment of Eisenhower’s reluctance to
commit federal resources to open-ended and prestige-focused stunts. The
hesitance in launching the first orbital satellite, although politically
disastrous, was prudently based on concerns that foreign countries might object
to orbital overflights by potential reconnaissance vehicles. With the Soviet
Union launching the first satellite Sputnik, such criticism would be rendered
moot, although this triumph enabled Khrushchev to persuasively promote Soviet
hegemony and stoke American fears of missile delivery for nuclear explosives. McDougall
further argues that the mandate to complete Apollo on Kennedy’s schedule
prompted the space program to become identified almost exclusively with
high-profile, expensive, human spaceflight projects as the Apollo project became
a race against the Soviet Union for recognition as the world leader in science
and technology and, by extension, in other fields, as well.
Most
Americans have forgotten that Eisenhower advocated an “open skies” policy as
regards to space exploration as a way to reduce the potential of overreacting
to a perceived threat due to insufficient or faulty mobilization information (as
well as reduce military expenditures). Khrushchev, in contrast, was trying to
obscure both the true, militaristic intentions of the Soviet Union, and the
capabilities of Soviet military power projection in order to preserve Russian options
in diplomatic and domestic intimidation. The United States wanted more open
information so as to avoid a future Pearl Harbor and the Russians wanted to maintain
their eastern-European gains without obligation to show their economic weakness
and armed force limitations. Although sharing the information with the
citizenry was an ultimate preference (now available thanks to LandSat, SPOT and
other orbiting cameras), Eisenhower directed the first reconnaissance
satellites as the Discovery series to look behind the Iron Curtain.
Thus,
McDougall juxtaposes the American effort of Apollo with the Soviet space
program and the dreams of such designers as Sergei Pavlovich Korolev to land a
Soviet cosmonaut on the Moon. The author recognizes Apollo as a significant
engineering achievement but concludes that it was also enormously costly both
in terms of resources and the direction to be taken in state support of science
and technology. In the end, NASA had to stress engineering over science,
competition over cooperation, civilian over military management, and
international prestige over practical applications. Kennedy, in his turn,
responded to Khrushchev’s overtures by upping the stakes, federalizing research
towards attention-grabbing endeavors with an eye towards employing
technological problem-solving ultimately to social engineering against poverty
and racism. Neither Kennedy nor Johnson appeared to realize that engineering
solutions and welfare statism address not only different problem categories,
but their agents differ: engineers tend to focus on the measurable and
quantitative, whereas social workers (unless flaking for larger budgets) appeal
to a more ethereal empathy with their charges. Professor McDougall shows the
underlying hubris behind these policies, and how this was integrated into the
manned (and unmanned) programs for NASA. Not all agree with McDougall’s
arguments, but since the publication of …the
Heavens and the Earth historians have been striving to equal its
scintillating analysis, stellar writing, and scope of discussion.
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